Consensus parameters
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Block interval | 60 seconds |
| Producer selection | deterministic pseudo-random over masternodes, per block, with fallback slots |
| Finality committee | per-operator ECVRF sortition, redrawn every block |
| Finality threshold | ⌈2/3 · min(E, N)⌉ — N = operators at the block, E = committee cap (128) |
| Quorum floor | 4 distinct operators minimum to finalize |
| Finality latency | ~1 minute (one signature round) |
| Counting unit | the operator key — N masternodes under one operator = 1 vote |
| Signatures | ECDSA / secp256k1 (finality and blocks); RedJubjub inside Sapling |
| Block reward | 0 |
| Coinbase | = transaction fees, exactly |
| Treasury | none |
| Unit of account | the satoshi |
| Supply source | verified Bitcoin burns only |
| Slashing | none — deliberate (why) |
Reading the table
The threshold formula is the part worth internalizing: with few operators (N ≤ E) everyone signs and the threshold follows N; at scale the VRF samples ~E of them. One fixed cap covers a handful of launch operators through hundreds, with no parameter change — and committee size does not affect latency, since collection is a single parallel gossip round.
Once the threshold is met, the block is irreversible: a conflicting chain is rejected regardless of its length. Finality overrides chainwork.